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When Xi Jinping acceded to the position of General Secretary in 
November 2012, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was both en-
joying high levels of popular support and facing an intimidating array 
of challenges (Tang 2016). As the working-age population peaked and 
the domestic labour market tightened, China was beginning a poten-
tially painful reconfiguration of its economic model away from the 
export-driven, low-end, and ecologically costly manufacturing that 
had served it so well since the early 1990s (Economist 2015; Minzner 
2015). Internationally, China’s wider global economic footprint, com-
bined with its growing military power, meant that the necessity, the 
desirability, or even the possibility of continuing to adhere to the 
doctrine of “hiding one’s light under a bushel” (东ݹޫᲖ, taoguang 
yanghui) was becoming increasingly open to question (Chen and Wang 
2011). 
Furthermore, China’s domestic political difficulties had been 
nearing crisis point. The growing popular perception that China’s 
political elites were privately enriching themselves at the cost of pub-
lic well-being had been fuelled by events such as the Wenzhou train 
crash a year earlier, and by investigative reports into the financial 
assets of well-connected families (Barboza 2012; Osnos 2014). Wide-
spread ownership of smartphones and the spread of social media 
technologies, most notably Weibo, the microblogging platform, had 
made it easier for concerned citizens to expose and spread news of 
local corruption and its perpetrators (Sullivan 2013). Crowning it all, 
the Bo Xilai affair had uncovered malpractice at the highest levels of 
Chinese politics and exposed divisions within the CCP elite itself 
(Garnaut 2012). 
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 
Autumn 2017 marked five years since Xi acceded to the position of 
General Secretary of the CCP and provides a good opportunity to 
evaluate his administration’s success in handling these challenges, and 
to take stock of the changes taking place in Chinese politics and soci-
ety. With this aim, the articles in this topical issue are drawn from 
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those first presented at the workshop “State and Society under Xi 
Jinping: The First Five Years,” held on 5 January 2018 at Senate 
House, University of London.1 
Xi’s tenure has seen a considerable reconfiguration of China’s 
party state and its relationship with society – changes that are having 
an impact not just on the country’s domestic politics, but also on its 
interactions with the wider world. Xi came to office promising to 
fulfil the “China Dream” of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation” (Wang 2013). Central to this programme has been Xi’s at-
tempt to re-assert central control and discipline within the CCP, to 
re-assert Party control over the state, and to re-assert party-state con-
trol over society (Mai 2017): 
The whole Party must realise that if our Party management is not 
strong, if our Party governance is not strict, then the prominent 
contradictions and problems that are pressing concerns for the 
masses of the people will not be resolved soon enough; the foun-
dations of our Party’s rule will shake and collapse. (Xi 2017; 
author’s own translation) 
This project of strengthening central control has both structural and 
ideological aspects to it – both of which raise multiple questions for 
academic researchers. 
First, in terms of structure, the issue of de-institutionalisation – 
especially its extent and novelty – has been the subject of intense 
scholarly debate. Numerous studies have argued that prior to Xi’s 
accession, the Chinese political system was becoming increasingly 
institutionalised in character: the development of specialised formal 
institutions, norm-bound political behaviour, and channels of popular 
input into the policymaking process were all posited as important 
factors underlying the CCP’s resilience (Holbig and Gilley 2010; Lee 

1 The workshop “State and Society under Xi Jinping: The First Five Years,” was 
organised by Phil Entwistle (Perrett Laver), Liam McCarthy-Cotter (University 
of the West of England), and Jonathan Sullivan (University of Nottingham), in 
association with the Political Studies Association’s Politics and Policy in South-
east and East Asia Specialist Group, the Centre for Politics in Africa, Asia and 
the Middle East (AAME), Royal Holloway, University of London, the China 
Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, and the School of Languages, Cul-
tures and Linguistics, University College Dublin. The workshop also received 
generous funding from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International 
Scholarly Exchange. 
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2017; Minzner 2015; Nathan 2003). Institutionalisation, it was claim-
ed, enabled the CCP to consolidate legitimacy in the eyes of the pub-
lic and its own elites, and to avoid messy succession crises such as the 
one which followed the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. 
However, some analysts contend that under Xi this process of 
institutionalisation has gone into reverse. He has broken prior con-
ventions, introducing a more personalised form of rule, re-politicising 
the policymaking process via the side-lining of state bodies in favour 
of Party institutions, crushing political rivals, filling the Politburo and 
Politburo Standing Committee with loyalists, and, most recently, 
abolishing presidential term limits (Economy 2018; Minzner 2015; 
Wang and Zeng 2016). Others disagree, arguing that Xi’s personal 
power flows from his institutional position, that the reconfiguration 
of China’s formal policymaking apparatus and informal rules consti-
tutes institution-building rather than de-institutionalisation, and that, 
away from the headlines, other forms of institutionalisation continue 
apace (Lee 2017; Wang 2017; Wang and Zeng 2016).  
A second structural trend that researchers have highlighted has 
been Xi’s alleged re-centralisation of power to Party headquarters. 
Evidence cited in support of this idea has included Xi’s anti-corrup-
tion campaign, the stricter enforcement of Party discipline, his em-
phasis on “top-level design” (亦ቲ䇮䇑, dingceng sheji), and the expan-
sion of the role of Leading Small Groups in the policymaking process 
(Ahlers and Stepan 2016; Heilmann 2016; Lee 2017). In wider society, 
those who had previously enjoyed a small sliver of organisational and 
ideological freedom, such as lawyers, universities, businesses, think 
tanks, and bloggers, have experienced increasing regulation and even 
repression (Economy 2018; Minzner 2015). Grass-roots Party organi-
sations have been strengthened in terms of their penetration of Chi-
nese businesses, and their involvement in these firms’ decision-mak-
ing (Economy 2018).  
The party-state security apparatus has taken an increasingly ac-
tive, some would say intrusive, role in its use of artificial intelligence-
enhanced surveillance to ensure social control and guard against 
threats to stability (Botsman 2017; Economist 2018). This has reached 
its most egregious extreme in Xinjiang, in the west of China, where 
members of the Uighur ethnic minority have been subject to blanket 
surveillance and mass incarceration (Rajagopalan 2017; Zenz 2019). 
Protests in Hong Kong over universal suffrage and the proposed 
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2019 extradition bill have their roots in the fear that under Xi the 
CCP has become increasingly meddlesome in the Special Administra-
tive Region’s society and politics, and has thereby violated the auton-
omy that the territory had been guaranteed under the 1984 Sino-
British Joint Declaration (Kaeding 2017). Further afield, the alleged 
use of student organisations affiliated with local People’s Republic of 
China embassies to monitor overseas Chinese nationals has drawn 
significant media attention – and no small amount of controversy 
(Allen-Ebrahimian 2018; Benner et al. 2018). 
However, other observers have pointed to centralising trends 
underway long before Xi’s coming to office – although they have also 
raised doubts as to the effectiveness of such measures in terms of 
ensuring even and consistent enforcement of central policy (see Van 
Rooij et al. 2017 on environmental policy; Yang 2017 on stability 
maintenance). It is therefore necessary to ask to what extent these 
perceived trends reflect the reality of China, and, if so, to what extent 
they represent a continuation of or break from political developments 
underway prior to 2012.  
Inextricably linked to these structural aspects of Xi’s practice of 
power is the question of ideology. In 2012 – indeed, throughout 
much of the preceding decade – the observer of Chinese politics 
could be forgiven for thinking that, on the surface at least, the CCP 
was communist in name only (Pei 2002; cf. McGregor 2010). Several 
of this author’s own respondents, speaking in 2011 and 2012, claimed 
that it was career advancement and not Marxist ideology that had 
originally motivated them to join the Party (see also, Dickson 2014):  
If you’re excellent enough, the teachers will let you join the Party. 
[…] But not many people will tell you that to join the Party is to 
choose a kind of political belief. (Anonymous1 2012) 
I think that the Party’s core values are very weak. [...] I know 
about a thousand Party members; not a single one of them takes 
these things seriously [ᖃⵏ, dangzhen]. (Anonymous2 2011)
During his early years in power, Xi himself worried as much. In an 
August 2013 speech, he is alleged to have likened the Party’s ideolog-
ical weakness to calcium deficiency, arguing that it was a spiritual 
form of rickets – leading to “political deterioration, economic greed, 
moral degeneracy and corruption of life” (China Copyright and 
Media 2013). Xi has set out to change this state of affairs with a re-
newed emphasis on the control, renewal, and promotion of ideology, 
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first within the Party and second, by extension, the state – but also in 
wider society too (Ahlers and Stepan 2016; Brown 2017; Saich 2016; 
Wang and Zeng 2016; Zhao 2016). His crowning achievement in this 
regard is, of course, the incorporation into the CCP constitution of 
“Xi Jinping Thought,” or to give it its full name “Xi Jinping Thought 
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (Ґ䘁ᒣᯠ
ᰦԓѝഭ⢩㢢⽮Պѫѹᙍᜣ, Xi Jinping xin shidai Zhongguo tese shehui-
zhuyi sixiang). Its inclusion means that Xi’s influence over the political 
direction of the CCP is almost certain to outlast his now indefinite 
period of tenure as general secretary (Phillips 2017). Xi Jinping 
Thought has been disseminated into wider Chinese society through 
the official media, university and school curricula, and through newly 
established “Xi Thought Institutes” (Shepherd 2018). 
Nevertheless, questions remain over how important ideology is 
in practice – and indeed over the role that it plays in Xi’s project. As 
with the structural developments outlined above, how much of a 
departure from the Hu–Wen years do these ideological changes rep-
resent? Some would argue that, despite concerns to the contrary, 
ideology never really went away (Holbig and Gilley 2010; McGregor 
2010); the “core socialist values” that occupy a prominent place in Xi 
Jinping Thought, and which the administration has promoted with 
enthusiasm, were in fact first voiced by Hu Jintao (Gow 2017). There 
is also the question of content: What exactly is Xi Jinping Thought? 
How important is the legacy of Maoism? How does this all sit with 
the Party’s recently renewed emphasis upon China’s traditional cul-
ture (Holbig and Gilley 2010)? Finally, to what extent does ideology 
constitute a limit on Xi’s exercise of power – and how strong is it 
relative to limits of a more structural nature (Brown 2017; 
MacFarquhar 2016; Shih 2016; Wang and Zeng 2016)? 
The diverse articles included in this topical issue focus upon 
these interrelated themes. Yuanyuan Liu examines televised confes-
sion, a tool of ideological control that has been used with increasing 
frequency during Xi’s tenure. Drawing on the case of the imprisoned 
bookseller Gui Minhai, Liu’s critical discourse analysis reveals that 
under Xi televised confession combines Maoist tactics with appeals to 
traditional family values, and more recent emphases on legal dis-
course and nationalism to enforce party-state dominance and ideolog-
ical conformity.  
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However, unlike Mao-era confessions, mass participation is ab-
sent, which raises questions about the extent to which Xi can be por-
trayed as “the new Mao.” Furthermore, by dint of its inclusion in a 
well-known current affairs programme, Gui’s confession is not pre-
sented as a Cultural Revolution-style public spectacle but rather as the 
everyday story of another common criminal brought to justice by the 
state. Liu therefore argues that “its domestic propaganda value lies 
precisely in its banality, which blends into the Party’s everyday narra-
tive of what the world looks like, who the Chinese should be, and 
how they should behave” (Liu 2018: 37). 
Aleksandra Kubat highlights the insertion of elements of tradi-
tional morality into the CCP’s legitimation strategy. Kubat contends 
that Xi has explicitly promoted cultural tradition as a means of im-
proving Party theory, state governance, and cadre performance; as 
evidence, she examines the way in which Xi’s specific interpretation 
of traditional culture has been communicated through the resources 
published by the country’s cadre-training institutions. 
The charitable reading of this trend is that the CCP is now redis-
covering pre-modern Chinese social and political thought and explor-
ing its potential for providing ethical guidance at a time of unsettling 
socio-economic change and perceived moral corruption. This is a 
welcome corrective to the excesses of the Mao era, during which the 
Party – whose ideological roots lay in the iconoclastic May Fourth 
Movement – was in danger of throwing out the baby of traditional 
Chinese culture with the bathwater of regressive “feudal” practices. 
The less charitable reading, meanwhile, is that this enthusiasm for 
“excellent traditional culture” is a post hoc selective exhumation of 
classical Chinese philosophical themes in order to manufacture a 
sense of alignment and continuity between past and present political 
practice. In this way the CCP is able to position itself as the “natural, 
default inheritor of Chinese civilisational heritage while at the same 
time claiming the role of being its only legitimate carrier into the fu-
ture” (Kubat 2018: 78). 
Turning towards the more structural aspects of CCP organisa-
tion and recruitment, Jérôme Doyon analyses the evolution of the 
cadre-management system under Xi. He argues that the role of cen-
tral and local Party leaders’ levels of discretion in the promotion pro-
cess has increased at the expense of intra-party democracy. In fact, 
personnel decisions are increasingly less constrained by objective 
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criteria based on officials’ performance or age. In the short term, this 
strengthens CCP leaders’ control over personnel, and not only at the 
central level; however, in the long term, Doyon argues that it may 
result in limited turnover among local and central officials and even-
tually lead to gerontocracy, with young and talented cadres unable to 
achieve promotion. 
Doyon’s analysis adds nuance to the debate over political centrali-
sation: Xi has both concentrated power in his own hands and 
strengthened the hands of local Party leaders. In doing so, he has rein-
forced rather than undermined a key feature of China’s political sys-
tem: the combination of “high levels of local autonomy with a strong 
Party hierarchy,” as captured by Pierre Landry’s concept of “decentral-
ized authoritarianism” (Landry 2008, cited in Doyon 2018: 102–103).  
Dylan Loh employs field theory to examine Xi’s attempts at re-
asserting control over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and 
the effects that this has had upon China’s foreign policy behaviour. In 
a nutshell, field theory studies how individuals and groups construct 
social fields. Social fields, in turn, refer to temporal-spatial arenas 
where actors compete and cooperate for resources. Loh argues that 
Xi has introduced a set of incentives that encourage diplomats to 
demonstrate greater personal loyalty towards himself in the local 
diplomatic field, and greater assertiveness towards foreign actors in 
the transnational-transversal diplomatic field.  
Loh’s primary theoretical contribution here is in examining what 
happens when overlapping fields misalign – a hitherto neglected area 
of study within the existing academic literature. Furthermore, in 
drawing upon cases of China’s interaction with its Asian neighbours, 
Loh’s analysis also represents a departure from the until now some-
what Eurocentric focus of the practice agenda in International Rela-
tions scholarship. In terms of the practical implications for China’s 
politics, Loh argues that the diplomatic assertiveness that has 
emerged as a result of increased central control has had the effect of 
disrupting the previously held norms of international diplomacy and 
re-shaping them in China’s favour – but also of strengthening re-
sistance to Chinese pressure from other actors such as foreign states. 
Taken together, the articles presented in this topical issue paint a 
picture of an evolving party state, one in which conformity to the 
CCP’s ideological narrative and personal loyalty to the person of Xi – 
in whom it has become increasingly embodied – have grown in im-
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portance. This ideological narrative combines traditional, Maoist, na-
tionalist, and legal-rational elements, or, rather, the specific CCP in-
terpretations thereof, and has become key to Xi’s centralisation of 
power. It has been undergirded by a restructuring of incentives – 
both within the party state and in wider society – so as to reward 
displays of fealty and punish disloyalty.   
Furthermore, these articles add elements of nuance to the de-
bates around the influence of Xi on China’s state and society since 
2012. First, while they present evidence that generally supports the 
notion that China has undergone a process of political centralisation 
under Xi, they also serve to demonstrate that this shift in the configu-
ration of power should not be viewed as a straightforward zero-sum 
game. Doyon’s analysis demonstrates that Xi’s increased insistence 
upon loyalty to himself has paradoxically served to strengthen the 
discretion and agency of Party officials at every level, even as it has 
simultaneously emasculated the institutions of intra-party democracy. 
Similarly, Loh has shown that increased central control has in some 
ways served to constrain the actions of MOFA officials – for example, 
in their ability to build informal relationships with foreign diplomats. 
On the other hand, it has also empowered Chinese diplomats to chal-
lenge the norms that had hitherto characterised the transnational dip-
lomatic field – and, indeed, to shape them in China’s favour. 
Second, these contributions to this topical issue shed further 
light on the extent to which Xi represents a return to Maoist politics. 
Indeed, here the different analyses give us reason for caution. Paral-
lels have been drawn between the two leaders; Xi has condemned the 
“historical nihilists” who allegedly emphasise the discontinuities be-
tween China’s Mao and post-Mao eras; and, there are apparent simi-
larities – the strengthening of personal, ideological, and structural 
control – between their respective projects too.   
Ultimately, however, Xi’s political programme is fundamentally 
different from that of Mao. As Kubat outlines, this is most immedi-
ately evident in the raw materials out of which Xi has chosen to con-
struct his ideological agenda. To a greater extent than any of his pre-
decessors, Xi has explicitly attempted to fuse China’s communist and 
pre-communist ideological traditions – thereby casting the CCP as 
the custodian of Chinese culture, rather than its usurper.  
However, a less-remarked upon but perhaps more profound dif-
ference highlighted by Liu and Kubat in particular is in the relative 
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agency and importance ascribed to state and society. Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution arguably represented a re-assertion of the revolutionary 
agency of the masses against the state, or, at least, the bourgeois ele-
ments therein (Andreas 2002). While Xi is keen to appear close to the 
people, on his watch the role assigned in Party ideology to the partici-
pation and agency of the Chinese public has been minimised. He has 
shown no interest in capturing and unleashing the power of the mas-
ses against his enemies, a reticence perhaps informed by his family’s 
own traumatic experience during the Cultural Revolution (Buckley 
and Tatlow 2015; Minzner 2015). 
Third, while Xi’s centralisation of power may have positive 
short-term consequences in terms of enhanced central control over 
Party, state, and society, it also carries long-term risks. Loh has 
demonstrated the ways in which China’s increased diplomatic asser-
tiveness, resulting from the restructuring of incentives within the 
local (domestic) diplomatic field, has already begun to alienate poten-
tial diplomatic partners and provoke pushbacks (see also, Economist 
2019). Similarly, Doyon’s analysis suggests that the quality of China’s 
cadre corps may be compromised by the increased weight placed 
upon official discretion in promotion decisions, and by the de-priori-
tisation of intra-party democracy and objective performance 
measures. Likewise, the removal of age-limit norms risks a slide away 
from meritocracy and towards gerontocracy. This adds to the grow-
ing weight of popular and academic commentary claiming that trends 
that would seem (intentionally or not) to strengthen the hand of the 
party state in the short term may serve to weaken it in the long term 
(Economy 2018; Minzner 2015). 
The topical issue therefore promises to consolidate and further 
our scholarly understanding of how Xi has exercised power since 
acceding to office in 2012. Its contribution is not limited to the aca-
demic world, however. The workshop at which these articles were 
delivered attracted a diverse audience including journalists, think tank 
researchers, foreign policy-makers, and those engaged in business and 
trade with China, as well as interested members of the public – evi-
dence that, given the increasing centrality of China in world politics, 
there is a keen hunger for the theoretically and empirically driven 
insight that China-focused social scientists can provide.2 
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2 The views in this Introduction reflect my own and not those of my employer. 
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